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ABSTRACT: This study investigates the impact of Board of Commissioners 
(BoC) diversities on dividend payments in the listed family firms in Indonesia. 
This study uses diversity for gender, nationality and tenure to describe the 
board of commissioner diversities. Using a data set of listed family firms in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange over the period 2012-2016, we find evidence 
indicating that board gender diversity is positively related to dividend 
payment. Secondly, we find evidence that board tenure diversity is positively 
related to dividend payments. However, the board nationality diversity does 
not remain significant on dividend payments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Family businesses are believed to be the engine of growth for many 
countries. More than 95 percent of the world’s businesses are family owned, 
generating millions of employees and playing a vital role in the economy. In the 
Asia Pacific, the top 85 family firms have more than 3 million employees and 
give 4.3 percent of the region’s gross domestic product (Global Family Business 
Index, 2015). Then, family firms in Indonesia contribute around 40% of market 
capitalization in Indonesia and have the largest in various major industries 
including property (91%), agriculture (74%), energy (65%) and consumer goods 
(45%) (Boston Consulting Group Report, 2016). However, family firms are 
characterized by the absence of effective external governance mechanisms and 
conflicts between majority principals and minority principals (Morck et al., 
2005). This conflict has called as the minority-majority conflict, which this 
conflict involves the majority and minority principals in a firm (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000). 
Young et al., (2008) showed that developing countries, including 
Indonesia, tend to have agency conflicts between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders. The conflicts are due to the fact that companies in 
Indonesia are generally dominated by family-owned companies which usually 
have a strong relationship to company managers (Claessens et al., 2000; Chen, 
2001; La Porta et al., 1999). Family-owned companies can take over company 
resources and appoint non-qualified families in management firm (Carney, 
1998; Claessens et al., 2000). Agency problems that occur in family companies 
are due to shareholders who can control the company's management. So, the 
majority shareholders will take action that are beneficial for them and can harm 
the minority shareholders (Young et al,2008). 
Schulze et al., (2001) found that family firms generally have agency 
conflicts that are more difficult to resolve because the relationship between the 
owner and management is based on emotions, sentiments, and informal 
relationships. This relationship makes management tends to take actions that 
make the benefits for controlling shareholders and will make the company 
becomes ineffective (Young et al, 2008). Therefore, the implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance (GCG) is playing a vital role in a company. The GCG 
aims to maintain the efficiency of the company through the principles of 
transparency, responsibility, accountability, independency, and fairness. It also 
aims to protect the rights and obligations of shareholders. 
Companies in Indonesia are one of the countries that adopt the two-tier  
system, where the board of commissioners (BoC) and the board of directors 
(BoD) are separated. BoD is responsible for carrying out the management of the 
company for the benefit of the company and in accordance with the objectives 
and purposes of the company (Law of The Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 
2007 concerning limited liability companies). On the contrary, the duties of BoC 
are to supervise the management policies, both regarding the Company and the 
Company's business and advise the Directors (Article 108 of Law No. 40 of 2007 
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concerning Limited Liability Companies). The board of commissioners is 
appointed by the shareholders through the GMS. 
The duties and functions of BoC are to control management well and to be 
fair to minority and majority shareholders. The presence of the board of 
commissioners aims to make the company have a good corporate governance 
function and the company's agency conflict can be reduced. 
Agency problems will cause agency costs. There are several ways to 
reduce agency costs, one of which is to pay dividends and increase funding 
with debt (Megginson, 1997). Furthermore, Megginson (1997) shows that 
dividend distribution and debt payment can be used as a management bonding 
mechanism. Bonding management is a form of control mechanism through a 
manager's policy to be able to secure shareholders. Bonding aims to equate the 
interests of management through programs that bind management's personal 
wealth into the wealth of the company (Megginson, 1997). 
Paying higher dividends to shareholders will reduce the free cash flow 
available to company management thus reducing the level of agency problems 
(Firth, Gao, Shen, & Zhang, 2016; Ben-Nasr, 2015). The company's board of 
commissioners can influence company management by asking management to 
pay higher dividends when management tends to want to maintain excess cash. 
One way that can be done is to have a board of commissioners who have a 
background that can affect management's overall decisions, including those 
relating to dividends (Saeed and Sameer, 2017). 
The diversity of the BoC can be seen in terms of gender, nationality and 
tenure of the board of commissioners. For example, women contribute to 
improve the quality of corporate governance by providing different 
perspectives in discussion and making the board more attractive (Chen et al., 
2014). Byoun (2016) found that US companies with gender diversity boards 
tend to increase the propensity to pay dividend.  
In addition, the existence of foreign citizens can take a variety of opinions 
and professional experience and different thoughts on the board of 
commissioners (Ararat et al., 2010). Hamzah and Zulkafli (2014) show that the 
diversity of foreign commissioners is positively related to dividend payout. The 
study shows that having foreign commissioners on the boardroom will bring 
benefits to shareholders because the board will become more independent and 
monitoring can run well, so the level of expropriation in the company can be 
reduced. 
The long term of the board of commissioners makes commissioners grow 
mature and prudent in the decision-making in the company. Hamzah and 
Zulkafli (2014) explain that long board tenure has a negative relationship with 
the corporate expropriation in Malaysian public companies. Therefore, the 
company needs to follow the recommendations of The Malaysian Corporate 
Governance Code, which suggests the commissioner tenure should be lower or 
the same as nine years. It aims to prevent a close relationship between 
management and commissioners. Presence of diverse commissioners in 
emerging countries is important (Saeed and Sameer, 2017; Bathala & Rao, 1995; 
Faccio et al., 2001). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Agency Theory 
In emerging economies, like Indonesia, laws and regulations regarding 
accounting requirements, information disclosure, securities trading, and their 
enforcement are inefficient (Young et al, 2008). Therefore, standard of corporate 
governance system in emerging economies tends to relatively small (Peng, 2004; 
Peng et al., 2003) and relational ties, business groups, family connections, and 
government contacts, playing vital role in corporate governance (Peng and 
Heath, 1996; Yeung, 2006). 
Institutional environments in emerging economies are weak, and the 
founding family still control their firms. Firms tried to appear from founder 
control to professional management, but the founder still keep to control the 
firms (Liu et al., 2006; Young et al., 2004). Therefore, family firms may do the 
expropriation of non-family minority shareholders (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2006). Family owners may do the expropriation and add nor competent family 
members to management (Carney, 1998; Claessens et al., 2000). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that this strategy can make the majority shareholders to do 
easily the expropriation. So, corporate should have BoC that can protect the 
minority shareholder and reduce the expropriation from management or 
controlling shareholder. 
Gender Diversity 
Commissioner board with high gender diversity is believed that have a 
more effective monitoring ability to the manager in order to protect the 
shareholders interest (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). In addition, a gender diverse 
board have greater monitoring than non-diverse board, because diverse board 
tend to have various ideas and active suggestions in evaluating management 
decisions (Chen et al., 2014). Female commissioners are supposed to be good 
monitors to protect the shareholders right. The presence of female 
commissioners on the commissioner board enhanced the board more 
independent (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000). In addition, women will enhance the 
quality of governance in the boardroom by giving different perspective and 
make a board more interactive and increase the board efficiency (Sing et al., 
2008; Ruigrok et al., 2007). Therefore, female commissioners would give 
advantages to the shareholder and increase the monitoring effectively in the 
board (Hamzah dan Zulkafli, 2014). 
                (
                                             
                                           
)     ……. 2.1 
Nationality Diversity 
Denis and McConnel (2003) explain that corporate governance aims to 
maximize the firm value. Therefore, every action and decision are expected to 
give advantages to all principals of the company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
argue that good corporate governance will make the management to give the 
return on shareholder’s investments, and the BoC roles are to protect the 
shareholders’ interest. It is consistent with Claessens (2006) view that the BoC 
take the important role in corporate governance. 
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Nationality diversity on BoC will make a better decision and strategy 
for company and will increase the monitoring to avoid the expropriation by 
management of the company. When the monitoring is success, the 
expropriation will reduce in company. Having foreign board in board room 
increased the monitoring function. Then, the foreign board presence made the 
boardroom more independent. It caused expropriation has reduced and the 
power of existing board members has resisted (Choi et al., 2007), foreign board 
bring new idea, views, experiences and perspectives (Ararat et al., 2010). 
                     (
                                                
                                            
)     ……....2.2 
 
Tenure Diversity 
The other factor that determines the commissioner quality is board 
tenure. Making commissioners to retire quickly, will leads to a waste of talent 
and experience (Vance, 1983). With their vast experience, it can enhance the 
effectiveness of the monitoring in the firm (Liu & Sun, 2005). The NACD (1996) 
recommends the tenure of the board have to a maximum of 10 to 15 years. It 
aims to get the new ideas and critical thinking for management. Similarly, 
Hamzah and Zulkafli (2014) find that longer board tenure indicate a higher 
corporate expropriation. This cause board members with longer tenure have 
strong relationship with the management that bring the expropriations and 
make the monitoring be less effective. 
Therefore, the firms need to have a right composition for the tenure of 
BoC. It aims that the board of commissioners can be critical in providing 
appropriate advice for the management of the company and conducting good 
supervision (Vafeas, 2003). When monitoring in family firms goes well, the 
expropriation at the firms will decrease. Expropriation is the process of using 
controls to maximize the insider welfare of a company. There are several 
policies that can lead to expropriation such as a declining dividend policy that 
is not even distributed. So, it can be concluded if monitoring in a company is 
going well, then expropriation will decrease and dividends distributed to 
shareholders will be higher. 
                 
 (
                                                                           
                                           
)     ……2.3 
Dividend Payout Ratio 
The dividends paid by companies divided by the profits available to 
shareholders are known as the dividend payout ratio (DPR) (Hartono, 1998). 
Ang (1997) states that the greater the dividends distributed, the greater the 
dividend payout ratio will make investors interested. However, the dividend 
payout ratio will weaken the company's internal financial because it minimizes 
retained earnings. Therefore, managers must see clearly whether the decision 
will have an effect on shareholders. Almost all companies have an awareness 
of the target level of dividend payments in the long run. If management tries 
to follow targets every year, the level of dividends will be fluctuating or 
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uncertain. Management tries to flatten dividends by changing dividends every 
year. Management also has an expected return in the future, which aims to 
regulate its long-term targets. Increased dividends are a sign of management 
being optimistic about the company's prospects going forward. 
 
                    
                 
                
…………………................….……. 2.4 
The Relationship between Gender Diverse Board on Dividend Payout Ratio  
Gender diverse board have greater monitoring than no diverse board, 
because they have various thinking and active oversights in evaluating 
management decisions (Chen et al., 2014). Female commissioners are supposed 
to be a good monitor that aims to guide the shareholders right. Empirical 
evidences show that gender diverse boards positively related to dividend 
payout. For example, Van Pelt (2013) find that gender diverse board and 
dividend payout ratio are significantly positive. Jurkus et al., (2011) show a 
greater percentage of female commissioners in US firms indicate a smaller 
agency cost and higher dividends. Byoun (2016) shows that firms with high 
gender diversities in commissioner board tend to pay higher dividends than 
firms with low gender diversities in commissioner board.  
The Relationship between Nationality Diverse Board on Dividend Payout Ratio  
Nationality diversity on BoC will make a better decision and strategy for 
company and will increase the monitoring to avoid the expropriation by 
management of the company. When the monitoring is success, the 
expropriation will reduce in company. The foreign commissioner in board of 
commissioners increased the monitoring function because the board becomes 
more independent. It caused a decreasing in expropriation (Choi et al., 2007). 
Foreign board could be a good corporate governance mechanism. A foreign 
commissioner brings new idea, experiences and perspectives (Ararat et al., 
2010). 
The Relationship between Tenure Diverse Board on Dividend Payout Ratio  
Board members will get mature when tenure on the board is long. When 
the boardroom grows mature, it will affect in the decision making. Buchanan 
(1974) suggests that long tenure increases organizational promise and 
willingness to expend effort toward company goals. But, The NACD (1996) 
recommends the tenure of the board have to a maximum of 10 to 15 years. It 
aims to get the new ideas and critical thinking for management. Similarly, 
Hamzah and Zulkafli (2014) find that longer board tenure may indicate a higher 
corporate expropriation. This causes board members with greater tenure have 
strong relationship with the management that bring the expropriations and 
make the monitoring be less effective. 
Therefore, the company needs to have a right composition for the tenure 
of BoC. It aims that the board of commissioners can be critical in providing 
appropriate advice for the management of the company and conducting good 
supervision (Vafeas, 2003). When monitoring in family firms goes well, the 
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expropriation at the firms will decrease. Expropriation is the process of using 
controls to maximize the insider welfare of a company. There are several 
policies that can lead to expropriation such as a declining dividend policy that 
is not even distributed. So, it can be concluded if monitoring in a company is 
going well, then expropriation will decrease and dividends distributed to 
shareholders will be higher. 
From the description above, a conceptual framework can be developed in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 1 
Conceptual Framework 
 
From the picture above, the hypotheses that will be tested in this study 
can be formulated as follows : 
1. Board gender diversity is positively related to dividend payouts in 
family firms. 
2. Board nationality diversity is positively related to dividend payouts in 
family firms. 
3. Board tenure diversity is positively related to dividend payouts in 
family firms. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study used a sample of family firms listed on Indonesia stock 
Exchange and consistently published financial statements in Rupiah during 
period 2012-2016. We got final sample of 51 firms for gender variable and 54 
family firms for nationality and tenure variable. This study uses three models 
because researchers have tried to use one model, but the diversity of gender, 
nationality and tenure on the board of commissioners in Indonesia is still rare in 
some Non-Financial firms. So, the researchers used three models that aims to 
avoid the biased on this research. The OLS regression model will be used to test 
all hypotheses in this research, the model is shown as below :  
Model 1 : 
To find out the effect of gender diversity on dividend payout ratio with 
firm size and board size control variables, it is necessary to build a regression 
equation model as follows: 
                                                
 
 
 
 
Gender Diverse 
Board 
Dividend Payout 
Ratio 
Nationality Diverse 
Board 
Tenure Diverse 
Board 
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Model 2 : 
To find out the effect of nationality diversity on dividend payout ratio 
with firm size and board size control variables, it is necessary to build a 
regression equation model as follows: 
                                                
 
Model 3 : 
To find out the effect of tenure diversity on dividend payout ratio with 
firm size and board size control variables, it is necessary to build a regression 
equation model as follows: 
                                                
 
Where : 
DIV   = Dividend Payout Ratio 
GENCOM = Gender Commissioners 
NATCOM = Nationality Commissioners 
TENCOM = Tenure Commissioners 
FIRSIZ  = Firm Size 
BOASIZ = Board Size 
ε   = Error 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics  
GENDER N Min Max Mean Std Dev 
DIV 
GENCOM 
FIRSIZ 
BOASIZ 
186 
186 
186 
186 
 
0,0000 
0,0000 
19,812 
0,6931 
 
0,777 
0,6667 
31,782 
2,1972 
 
0,0928 
0,1402 
27,943 
1,3099 
 
0,1617 
0,1712 
2,0723 
0,3573 
NATIONALITY N Min Max Mean Std Dev 
DIV 
NATKOM 
FIRSIZ 
BOASIZ 
212 
212 
212 
212 
0,0000 
0,0000 
19,812 
0,6931 
0,5928 
1,0000 
32,151 
2,1972 
 
0,1454 
0,0732 
28,247 
1,3629 
 
0,1587 
0,1805 
2,1247 
0,3655 
 
TENURE N Min Max Mean Std Dev 
DIV 
TENKOM 
FIRSIZ 
BOASIZ 
257 
257 
257 
257 
 
0,0000 
0,0000 
19,812 
0,6931 
0,7774 
1,0000 
32,151 
2,1972 
 
0,1443 
0,4592 
28,126 
1,3181 
 
0,1728 
0,3147 
1,9792 
0,3499 
 
 
Table 1 presented the descriptive statistics for all variables 1. The 
observations of this research are 51 public family firms in Indonesia. The 
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maximum and mean of dividend payout ratio value are 0,092 and 0,777. In 
gender observations, some family firms have zero woman commissioners, 
while a family firm has the maximum of 0,6667 woman sit in the board of 
commissioners. On other hand, for nationality diverse board observation used 
54 listed family companies in Indonesia. The mean and maximum of dividend 
payout ratio are 0,145 and 0,5928. In observations of nationality diversity, some 
family firms have zero foreign commissioners. On another hand, some family 
firms have full of foreigners commissioners sit in the boardroom. And for board 
tenure diversity observations used 54 listed family companies in Indonesia. The 
mean and maximum of dividend payout ratio are 0,144 and 0,7774. In tenure 
observations, some family firms in Indonesia have zero commissioners with 
tenure minimum of 9 years while some family firms have all commissioners 
with tenure 9 years or more than 9 years. 
 
Hypotheses Test 
Table 2 shows the regression result of the gender diversity of 
commissioner boards and dividend payout ratio. The board gender diversity 
has a positive relationship with dividend payout ratio. If gender diversity is 
effective in monitoring and resolve the shareholder–manager conflict of 
interests, then it tend to disciplines management for influencing payout policy 
(McGuinness et al., 2015). Previous study shows that female commissioners 
are expected to be good monitors that further strengthen the shareholder 
rights 
 
Table 2 
The Result of Gender Regression Model 
Model 1 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -0,786 0,148  -5,328        0,000* 
GENCOM 0,133 0,063   0,141 2,102 0,037* 
FIRSIZ 0,026 0,005   0,332 4,935 0,000* 
 BOASIZ 0,105 0,030   0,231 3,514 0,001* 
       R              =   0,472 
       R2                   =   0,223 
Std. Error =  0,1437 
       F                =  17,421 
       Sig            =   0,000 
*Sig at 5% level 
Result reported in Table 3 indicates that insignificant relationship between 
nationality diversity on BoC and dividend payout ratio. As evidenced, our 
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study found that there are rarely a foreign commissioner sits on the board of 
family firms in Indonesia. The findings could also be explained by the lack of 
talented foreign commissioner in certain fields.  
 
Table 3 
The Result of Nationality Regression Model 
Model 2 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -0,782         0,132  -5,918 0,000* 
NATCOM 0,032 0,056   0,037 0,576 0,565 
FIRSIZ 0,030 0,005   0,389 6,278 0,000* 
 BOASIZ 0,060 0,028   0,139 2,164 0,032* 
       R              =   0,460 
       R2             =   0,211 
Std. Error =  0,1419 
       F               =  18,578 
       Sig            =   0,000 
*Sig at 5% level 
 
 
Table 4 
The Result of Tenure Regression Model 
Model 3 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -0,895        0,139  -6,451 0,000* 
TENCOM 0,077      0,031   0,140 2,503 0,013* 
FIRSIZ 0,032       0,005   0,371 6,436 0,000* 
 BOASIZ 0,071       0,028   0,145 2,513 0,013* 
       R              =   0,451 
       R2             =  0,203 
Std. Error =  0,1551 
       Fhitung        =  21,541 
       Sig            =   0,000 
*Sig at 5% level 
 
CONCLUSION 
Indonesia is one of the emerging countries. Saeed and Sameer (2017) show 
that presence of diverse commissioners in emerging countries are important, 
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due to the prevalence of weak governance, greater concentrated ownership and 
institutional instability. Due to evidence from previous research, we get the 
effect of board diversity on dividend payouts. Our paper focuses on family 
listed companies in Indonesia. The results reveal that board gender diversity on 
board of commissioners is positively significant on dividend payouts ratio. 
Gender diverse board have better monitoring than non-gender diverse board, 
because they have some thinking and active oversight in evaluating 
management judgments (Chen et al., 2014). Female commissioners are 
suggested to be good monitors to protect the shareholders right. In addition, a 
right composition for gender and tenure on board of commissioners will 
enhance ability of board of commissioners to audit the financial statements on 
family firms.  
The nationality diversity on board of commissioners indicates an 
insignificant relationship with dividend payout ratio. In Indonesia, we rarely 
found a foreign commissioner sit on the board of family firms in Indonesia. This 
study is limited by sample, so we recommend that future study to put more 
number of observations because small observations bring to unbiased result on 
the effect board nationality diversity on dividend payout ratio. 
Thirdly, board tenure diversity is positively related to dividend payouts. 
Long tenure makes the board becoming mature in decision making process. 
With experiences, they are better to take decision in the firm (Liew et al., 2011). 
Moreover, new commissioners will bring the fresh ideas and critical thinking 
for management. Critical thinking for management will also increase the 
effectiveness of monitoring on financial statements (Liu & Sun, 2005). Therefore, 
the company needs to have a right composition for the tenure of board of 
commissioners, because commissioners tenure is one of the commissioners 
qualities (Vafeas, 2003). 
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